

AWS Security Incident Response

Guide

May 2019



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Contents

- Introduction 1
 - Prerequisite Resources.....1
 - Security Perspective of Cloud Adoption Framework.....2
 - Foundation of Incident Response2
- Educate3
 - Shared Responsibility3
 - Incident Response in the Cloud.....4
 - Cloud Security Incidents5
 - Understanding Cloud Capabilities7
- Prepare: People.....9
 - Define Roles and Responsibilities9
 - Define Response Mechanisms10
 - Create a Receptive and Adaptive Security Culture.....11
 - Predicting Response11
- Prepare: Technology14
 - Prepare Access to AWS Accounts14
 - Prepare Processes.....18
 - Cloud Provider Support.....23
- Simulate24
 - Security Incident Response Simulations24
 - Simulation Steps25
 - Simulation Examples.....26
- Iterate27
 - Runbooks27
 - Automation28
- Incident Response Examples.....30

Service Domain Incidents	30
Infrastructure Domain Incidents.....	32
Summary.....	35
Additional Resources	35
Media	36
Third-Party Tools.....	37
Industry References	37
Appendix A: Examples	38
Appendix B: Cloud Capability Definitions	42
Logging and Events	42
Visibility and Alerting	44
Automation	45
Secure Storage	46
Custom	47

About This Guide

This guide presents an overview of the fundamentals of responding to security incidents within a customer's AWS cloud environment. It focuses on an overview of cloud security and incident response concepts, and identifies cloud capabilities, services, and mechanisms that are available to customers for responding to security issues.

Introduction

Security is the highest priority at AWS. As an AWS customer, you will benefit from a data center and network architecture built to meet the requirements of the most security-sensitive organizations. The AWS Cloud enables a shared responsibility model. While AWS manages security “of” the cloud, you are responsible for security “in” the cloud. This means that you retain control of the security you choose to implement. You get access to hundreds of tools and features to help you to meet your security objectives. These capabilities help you establish a security baseline that meets your objectives for your applications running in the cloud.

However, when a deviation from your baseline occurs, such as by a misconfiguration, you may need to respond and investigate. This paper helps you understand the basic concepts of security incident response within your AWS environment, and the prerequisites you will need to consider to prepare, educate, and train your cloud teams before security issues occur. This paper reviews the controls and capabilities at your disposal, provides topical examples for resolving potential concerns, and outlines remediation methods that leverage automation to improve the speed of a response.

As security incident response can be a complex topic, we encourage customers to start small, develop runbooks, leverage basic capabilities, and create an initial library of incident response mechanisms to iterate from and improve upon. This initial work should include teams that are not involved with security and should include your legal department, so that you are better able to understand the impact that incident response (IR) and the choices made have on your corporate goals.

This paper is intended for those in technical roles and assumes that you are familiar with the general principles of information security, have a basic understanding of incident response in your current on-premises environments, and have some familiarity with cloud services.

Prerequisite Resources

In addition to this document, we encourage you to review the [AWS Security Best Practices](#) whitepaper and the [Security Perspective of the AWS Cloud Adoption Framework \(CAF\)](#) whitepaper. The AWS CAF provides guidance that supports coordinating the different parts of organizations that are moving to cloud computing. The CAF guidance is broken into a number of areas of focus that are relevant to implementing cloud-based IT systems, which we refer to as *perspectives*. The security

perspective describes how to execute a security program across ten several workstreams, one of which focuses on incident response. This document details some of our experiences in helping customers in assessing and implementing successful mechanisms within that workstream.

Security Perspective of Cloud Adoption Framework

The Security Perspective includes four components:

- **Directive controls** establish the governance, risk, and compliance models within which the environment operates.
- **Preventive controls** protect your workloads and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities.
- **Detective controls** provide full visibility and transparency over the operation of your deployments in AWS.
- **Responsive controls** drive remediation of potential deviations from your security baselines.

Although incident response (IR) is generally viewed under the Responsive component, responsive controls are dependent and influenced by the other components. For example, directive and preventative security controls help establish a baseline, so you can monitor and investigate any deviations from this baseline. This approach not only eliminates noise, but it also contributes to a defense in-depth security design.

Foundation of Incident Response

All AWS users within an organization should have a basic understanding of security incident response processes, and security staff must deeply understand how to react to security issues. Experience and education are vital to a cloud incident response program before handling a security event. The foundation of a successful incident response program in the cloud is to *Educate, Prepare, Simulate, and Iterate*.

To understand each of these aspects, consider the following descriptions:

- **Educate** your security operations and incident response staff about cloud technologies and how your organization intends to use them.

- **Prepare** your incident response team to detect and respond to incidents in the cloud, enabling detective capabilities, and ensuring appropriate access to the necessary tools and cloud services. Additionally, prepare the necessary runbooks, both manual and automated, to ensure reliable and consistent responses. Work with other teams to establish expected baseline operations, and use that knowledge to identify deviations from those normal operations.
- **Simulate** both expected and unexpected security events within your cloud environment to understand the effectiveness of your preparation.
- **Iterate** on the outcome of your simulation to improve the scale of your response posture, reduce time to value, and further reduce risk.

Educate

Shared Responsibility

The responsibility for security and compliance is shared between AWS and you. This shared model relieves some of your operational burden because AWS operates, manages, and controls the components from the host operating system and virtualization layer down to the physical security of the facilities in which the service operates.

You are responsible for managing the guest operating systems (including updates and security patches), application software, as well as configuring the AWS provided security controls, like security groups, network access control lists, and identity and access management. You should carefully consider the services you use, because your responsibilities vary depending on the services used, the integration of those services in your IT environment, and applicable laws and regulations.

[Figure 1](#) shows a typical representation of the shared responsibility model as it applies to infrastructure services like Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2). It breaks most responsibilities into two categories: security “*of*” the cloud (managed by AWS) and security “*in*” the cloud (managed by the customer). Note that the responsibilities change depending on the service that you use. For abstracted services, such as Amazon S3 and Amazon DynamoDB, AWS operates the infrastructure layer, the operating system, and platforms, and customers access the endpoints to store and retrieve data. Customers are responsible for managing their data (including encryption options), classifying their assets, and using IAM tools to apply the appropriate permissions.




Figure 1: Shared Responsibility Model

In addition to the direct relationship you have with AWS, there may be other entities that have responsibilities in your particular responsibility model. For example, you may have internal organizational units that take responsibility for some aspects of your operations. You may also have partners or other third parties that develop, manage, or operate some of your cloud technology.

Incident Response in the Cloud

Design Goals of Cloud Response

Although the general processes and mechanisms of incident response, such as those defined in the [NIST SP 800-61 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide](#), still hold true, we encourage you to consider these specific design goals that are relevant to responding to security incidents in a cloud environment:

- **Establish response objectives.** Work with your stakeholders, legal counsel, and organizational leadership to determine the goal of responding to an incident. Some common goals include containing the incident, recovering the affected resources, preserving data for forensics, and attribution.
- **Respond using the cloud.** Implement your response patterns where the event and data occurs.

- **Know what you have and what you need.** Preserve logs, snapshots, and other evidence by copying them to a centralized security cloud account. Use tags, metadata, and mechanisms that enforce retention policies. For example, you may choose to use Linux `dd` command or a Windows equivalent to make a complete copy of data for investigative purposes.
- **Use redeployment mechanisms.** If a security anomaly can be attributed to a misconfiguration, the remediation might be as simple as removing the variance through a redeployment of the resources with the proper configuration. Where possible, make response mechanisms safe to execute more than once and on unknown state (i.e. idempotent).
- **Automate where possible.** As you see issues or incidents repeat, build mechanisms that programmatically triage and respond to common situations. Use human responses for unique, new, and sensitive incidents.
- **Choose scalable solutions.** Strive to match the scalability of your organization's approach to cloud computing and reduce the time between detection and response.
- **Learn and improve your process.** When you identify gaps in your process, tools, or people, plan to fix them. Simulations are safe ways to find gaps and improve processes.

Cloud Security Incidents

Incident Domains

There are three domains within the customer's responsibility where security incidents may occur: service, infrastructure, and application. The difference between the domains is related to the tools you use when responding. Consider these domains in more detail:

- **Service Domain:** Incidents in the service domain affect a customer's AWS account, IAM permissions, resource metadata, billing, and so on. A service domain event is one that you respond to exclusively with AWS API mechanisms, or have root causes associated with configuration or resource permissions, and may have related service-oriented logging.

- **Infrastructure Domain:** Incidents in the infrastructure domain include data or network-related activity, such as the traffic to your Amazon EC2 instances within the VPC, processes and data on your Amazon EC2 instances, and so on. Your response to infrastructure domain events often involves retrieval, restoration, or acquisition of incident-related data for forensics. It likely includes interaction with the operating system of an instance, and in some cases, may also involve AWS API mechanisms.
- **Application Domain:** Incidents in the application domain occur in the application code or software deployed to the services or infrastructure. This domain should be included in your cloud threat detection and response runbooks, and may incorporate similar responses as those in the infrastructure domain. With appropriate and thoughtful application architecture, this domain can be managed with cloud tools, using automated forensics, recovery and deployment.

In these domains, you must consider the actors who may act against your account, resources, or data. Whether internal or external, use a risk framework to determine what the specific risks are to your organization and prepare accordingly.

In the service domain, you are working to achieve your goals exclusively with AWS APIs. For example, handling a data disclosure incident from an S3 bucket involves API calls to retrieve the bucket's policy, analyzing the S3 access logs, and possibly looking at AWS CloudTrail logs. In this example, your investigation is unlikely to involve data forensic tools or network traffic analysis tools.

In the infrastructure domain, you may use a combination of AWS APIs and familiar digital forensics/incident response (DFIR) software within the operating system of a workstation, such as an EC2 instance that you've prepared for IR work. Infrastructure domain incidents may involve analyzing network packet captures, disk blocks on an Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) volume, or volatile memory acquired from an instance.

Indicators of Cloud Security Events

There are many security events that you may not classify as incidents, but may still be prudent to investigate. This section will review some mechanisms that you can use to detect security-related events in your AWS cloud environment. Though not an exhaustive list, consider the following examples of some potential indicators:

- **Logs and Monitors:** Review AWS logs, such as Amazon CloudTrail, Amazon S3 access logs, and VPC Flow Logs, and security monitoring services such as [Amazon GuardDuty](#) and [Amazon Macie](#). In addition, use monitors like Amazon Route 53 health checks and [Amazon CloudWatch](#) Alarms. Similarly, use Windows Events, Linux syslog logs, and other application-specific logs that you may generate in your applications.
- **Billing Activity:** A sudden change in billing activity may indicate a security event.
- **Threat Intelligence:** If you subscribe to a third-party threat intelligence feed, you can correlate that information with other logging and monitoring to identify potential indicators of events.
- **Partner Tools:** Partners within AWS Partner Network (APN) offer hundreds of industry-leading products that can help you meet your security objectives. See the [Security Partner Solutions](#) and [Security Solutions in the AWS Marketplace](#) for additional information.
- **AWS Outreach:** [AWS Support](#) may contact you if we identify abusive or malicious activity. See the [AWS Response to Abuse and Compromise](#) section for additional information.
- **One-Time (Ad Hoc) Contact:** Sometimes your customers, your developers, or other staff in your organization notice something unusual. It is important to have a well-known, well-publicized method of contacting your security team. Popular choices include ticketing systems, contact email addresses, and web forms. If your organization works with the general public, you may need to have a public-facing security contact mechanism as well.

Understanding Cloud Capabilities

AWS offers a wide range of security capabilities that you can use to investigate security events across the domains. For example, AWS provides a number of logging mechanisms, such as AWS CloudTrail logs, Amazon CloudWatch Logs, Amazon S3 access logs, and more. You'll want to consider the services that you're using, and ensure you have enabled the logs that pertain to those services. AWS also offers a [Centralized Logging Solution](#) on AWS Solutions to help you understand how to centralize and store the common types of cloud logs. Once you have enabled these logging sources, you'll need to decide how you want to analyze them, such as using [Amazon Athena](#) to query logs held in your Amazon S3 buckets.

Additionally, there are a number of AWS partner products that can simplify your process for analyzing these logs, such as those described in the [APN Security Competency program](#). Further, there are several AWS services that can help you gain valuable insights into this data, such as [Amazon GuardDuty](#), a threat detection service, and [AWS Security Hub](#), which can give you a comprehensive view of your high-priority security alerts and compliance status across AWS accounts. For more information about additional cloud capabilities that you can leverage during your investigations, see [Appendix B: Cloud Capability Definitions](#).

Data Privacy

We know customers care deeply about privacy and data security, and so we implement responsible and sophisticated technical and physical controls designed to prevent unauthorized access to or disclosure of customer content. Maintaining customer trust is an ongoing commitment. You can learn more about AWS data privacy commitments by visiting our [Data Privacy FAQ](#) web page.

These intentional, self-imposed controls, limit AWS ability to assist in responding within a customer's environment. Focusing on understanding and building capabilities within the Shared Responsibility Model is key to success. Although enabling logging and monitoring capabilities in your AWS accounts before an incident occurs is important, there are additional aspects to incident response that are imperative to a successful program.

AWS Response to Abuse and Compromise

Abuse activities are externally observed behaviors of AWS customers' instances or other resources that are malicious, offensive, illegal, or could harm other internet sites. AWS works with you to detect and address suspicious and malicious activities from your AWS resources. Unexpected or suspicious behaviors from your resources can indicate that your AWS resources have been compromised, which signals potential risks to your business.

AWS detects abuse activities in your resources using mechanisms, such as:

- AWS internal event monitoring
- External security intelligence against AWS network space
- Internet abuse complaints against AWS resources

Although the AWS abuse response team aggressively monitors and shuts down unauthorized activity running on AWS, the majority of abuse complaints refer to customers who have legitimate business on AWS. Common causes of unintentional abuse activities include:

- **Compromised resource:** For example, an unpatched Amazon EC2 instance could be infected and become a botnet agent.
- **Unintentional abuse:** For example, an overly aggressive web crawler might be classified as a denial-of-service attack by some internet sites.
- **Secondary abuse:** For example, an end user of the service provided by an AWS customer might post malware files on a public Amazon S3 bucket.
- **False complaints:** Sometimes internet users mistakenly report legitimate activities as abuse.

AWS is committed to working with AWS customers to prevent, detect, and mitigate abuse, and to defend against future recurrences. We encourage you to review the [AWS Acceptable Use Policy](#), which describes prohibited uses of the web services offered by Amazon Web Services and its affiliates. To support timely response to abuse notifications from AWS, ensure that your AWS account contact information is accurate. When you receive an AWS abuse warning, your security and operational staff should immediately investigate the matter. Delay can prolong the reputation impact and legal implications to others and to yourself. More importantly, the implicated abuse resource may be compromised by malicious users, and ignoring the compromise could magnify damages to your business.

Prepare: People

Automated processes enable organizations to spend more time focusing on measures to increase the security of their cloud environment and applications. Automated incident response makes humans available for correlating events, practicing in simulations, devising new response procedures, performing research, developing new skills, and testing or building new tools. Even with increased automation, analysts and responders within a security organization still have much to do.

Define Roles and Responsibilities

The skills and mechanisms of incident response are most important when handling new or large-scale events. Because we cannot predict or codify all potential events, humans

must do whatever the automation cannot. Handling unclear security events requires cross-organizational discipline, bias for decisive action, and the ability to deliver results. Within your organizational structure, there are probably many people who are responsible, accountable, consulted, or kept informed during an incident. Consider these roles and responsibilities, and whether any third-parties must be involved.

Trusted partners may be involved in the investigation or response that provide additional expertise and valuable scrutiny. You may need to contact owners of impacted applications or resources, as they are subject matter experts (SMEs) that can provide information and context. Application owners or SMEs may be required to act in situations where the environment is unfamiliar, has unanticipated complexity, or where the responders do not have access. Application SMEs should practice and become comfortable working with the IR Team.

Provide Training

To reduce dependency and decrease response time, ensure that security teams and responders are educated about cloud services and have opportunities to practice hands-on with the specific cloud platforms that your organization uses. AWS provides a number of training options and learning paths through digital training, classroom training, partners, and certifications. To learn more, see [AWS Training](#).

Beyond general cloud experience, most customers need to significantly invest in their people to be successful. Your organization would benefit by providing additional training to your staff to learn programming skills, development processes (i.e. version control systems, deployment practices, etc.), and infrastructure automation. As tempting as it may be to hire new staff who have the new skills, it is important to retain and retrain existing staff so that you maintain the institutional memory and experience that is vital to good incident response.

Define Response Mechanisms

When considering your approach to incident response in the cloud, in unison with other teams (such as your legal counsel, leadership, business stakeholders, and others), you must understand what you have and then what you need. First, identify stakeholders and relevant contacts, and ensure you have appropriate access to perform the necessary response.

Although the cloud can provide you with greater visibility and capabilities through service APIs, you must document where these are, and how to use them. Identify your team's AWS account numbers, the IP ranges of your Virtual Private Clouds (VPCs),

corresponding network diagrams, logs, data locations, and data classifications. Many of these technological processes are included in the [Prepare: Technology](#) section. Then, begin documenting your incident response procedures, often referred to as procedures or runbooks, that define the steps to investigate and remediate an incident.

Create a Receptive and Adaptive Security Culture

We have learned that our customers' most successful security teams are cooperative enablers for their business and its developers; fostering a culture that ensures escalation and cooperation from all stakeholders to maintain an agile, high-responsive security posture. Although improving your organization's security culture is not the subject of this document, you can receive relevant intelligence from your non-security staff if they view the security team to have a receptive culture. When your security team is open and accessible, with support from leadership, they will receive additional timely notifications and responses to security events.

In some organizations, staff may fear retribution if they report a security problem. Sometimes they simply don't know how to report an issue.

In other cases, they may not want to waste time or be embarrassed by reporting something as a security incident that turns out to be no problem at all. From the leadership team down, it is important to promote a culture of acceptance and invite everyone to feel part of the organization's security. Provide a clear channel for anyone to open a high-severity ticket, whenever they believe there may be a potential risk or threat. Welcome these notifications with an eager and open mind, but more importantly, make it clear to non-security staff that you welcome these notifications. Emphasize that you would rather be over-notified of potential issues, than to receive no notifications at all.

Moreover, these notifications offer valuable opportunities to practice responsive investigations under stress. They can serve as an important feedback loop while developing your response procedures into muscle memory.

Predicting Response

Human analysis must be relied upon wherever automation cannot as it is impossible to predict all potential events. Taking the time to carefully train your staff and prepare your organization will help you anticipate the unexpected. However, your organization does not have to prepare in isolation. This section includes the benefits of teaming up with trusted security partners and methods for identifying unexpected security events.

Partners and the Window of Response

The journey to the cloud is unique for every organization. However, there are patterns and practices that other organizations have encountered that a trusted security partner can bring to your attention. We encourage you to identify external AWS security partners that can provide you with outside expertise and a different perspective to augment your response capabilities.

Your trusted security partners can help you identify potential risks or threats that you may not be familiar with, which can be represented with a simple visual depiction.

In 1955, Joseph Luft and Harrington Ingham created the [Johari Window](#), an exercise for mapping traits to categories. The window is depicted as a grid consisting of four quadrants, similar to the following diagram.




Figure 2: Window of Response

Although Luft and Ingham's window was not intended for information security, we can adjust the concept slightly to use it as a simple mental model to consider the difficulty in assessing an organization's threats. In our modified concept, the four quadrants (as depicted above) are:

- **Obvious:** Risk of which both your team and your partner are aware.
- **Internally Known:** Risk with which your team is familiar, but that your partner isn't. This could mean that you have internal expertise or tribal knowledge.
- **Blind Spot:** Risk with which your partner is familiar, but that your team is not.
- **Unknown:** Risk with which neither you or your partner are familiar.

Although this diagram is simple, it is suitable to represent the value that having trusted partners can achieve. Most critically, there may be *blind spot* items that you are unaware of, but a partner with the right expertise can bring them to your attention. Although you may both be familiar with those risks in the *obvious* quadrant, your partner could recommend controls and solutions with which you are unfamiliar. Additionally, although you might bring those risks in the *internally known* quadrant to your partner's attention, your partner may also be able to identify optimized controls for mitigating that risk. As you're measuring yourself for improvement, bring in these partners to provide expert advice.

The Unknown

Assuming you've been laser-focused on tailoring alerts, improving your incident response procedures with automation, and improving your security defenses, you may be wondering what to improve next. You may be curious about your unknown risk, as represented in the unknown category of [Figure 2: Window of Response](#). You can reduce unknown risk through the following ways:

- **Define security assertions:** What are some truths that you can assert? What are the security primitives that should absolutely be true in your environment? Clearly defining these allows you to search for the inverse. This is something that's easier to do early in your cloud journey, rather than attempting to reverse engineer your security assertions later.
- **Education, communication, and research:** Create cloud security experts out of your own staff or bring in expert partners to put more eyes of scrutiny on your environment. Challenge your assumptions, and be wary of subtle reasoning. Create feedback loops in your processes and offer mechanisms for your engineering teams to communicate with security teams. Additionally, expand your approach to monitor relevant security mailing lists and information security disclosures.
- **Reducing attack surface:** Improve your defense to avoid risk and give yourself more time against unknown attacks. Block and slow down attackers; force them to be noisy.
- **Threat intelligence:** Subscribe to a continuous feed of current and relevant threats, risk, and indicators from around the world.
- **Alerts:** Generate notifications that alert you to unusual, malicious, or expensive activities. For example, you may alert on activities that occur in regions or services that you do not use.

- **Machine learning:** Leverage machine learning to identify complex anomalies for a specific organization or even individual personas, migrating away from static detection that rely on atomic metadata such as keywords or IP addresses. Profile the normal characteristics of your networks, users, and systems to assist in identifying unusual behaviors.

Amazon Web Services provides you with the tools and services to tackle all of these issues yourself. Using machine learning to identify malicious patterns is a well-researched field of study, with patterns being implemented by customers, AWS Professional Services, AWS Partners, and through AWS services like Amazon GuardDuty and Amazon Macie. Some of these patterns have been discussed at a number of AWS re:Invent conference sessions. See the [Media](#) section in [Additional Resources](#) for more information.

Customers are also expanding their traditionally business-centric data lakes to leverage similar architecture patterns to develop security data lakes. Security operations teams are also expanding their use of traditional logging and monitoring tools, such as ElasticSearch and Kibana, to big data architectures.

Those customers are collecting internal data from AWS CloudTrail event logs, VPC Flow Logs, Amazon CloudFront access logs, database logs, and application logs and blending this data with public data and threat intelligence. With this valuable data, customers have expanded to include data science and data engineering skills on their security operations teams to leverage tools such as Amazon EMR, Amazon Kinesis Data Analytics, Amazon Redshift, Amazon QuickSight, AWS Glue, Amazon SageMaker, and Apache MXNet on AWS to build custom solutions that identify and predict anomalies that are unique to their business.

Prepare: Technology

Prepare Access to AWS Accounts

During an incident, your incident response teams must have access to the environments and resources involved in the incident. Ensure that your teams have appropriate access to perform their duties before an event occurs. To do that, you must know what level of access your team members require (for example, what kinds of actions they are likely to take) and you must provision access in advance. Your team members' authentication and authorization should be documented and tested well before an event occurs to ensure they can perform a timely response without delays.

Customers at this stage must work closely with their cloud architecture and development teams to understand what level of access is necessary for responders. Identify and discuss the AWS account strategy and cloud identity strategy with your organization's cloud architects to understand what authentication and authorization methods are configured, such as:

- Federation, where a user assumes an IAM role in an AWS account from an Identity Provider.
- Cross-account access, where a user assumes an IAM role between multiple AWS accounts.
- Authentication to an AWS IAM user created within a single AWS account.

The preceding options define the technical choices for authentication to AWS, and how you may gain access during a response, but some organizations may rely on another team or a partner to assist in the response. User accounts that are used to respond to a security incident are often privileged in order to provide sufficient access. Therefore, access to use these user accounts should be restricted and they should not be used for daily activities.

Before creating new access mechanisms, first work with your cloud teams to understand how your AWS accounts are organized and governed. Many customers use AWS Organizations to help centrally manage billing; control access, compliance, and security; and share resources across their AWS accounts. A core feature of AWS Organizations is that it can be leveraged to apply [Service Control Policies](#) to groups of accounts, enabling you to gain policy management at scale. For additional information about implementing governance mechanisms at scale, see [AWS Governance at Scale](#). Once you have understood how your organization has organized and governed your AWS accounts, consider the following generalized response patterns to assist in identifying which approaches are right for your organization.

Indirect access

Customers that use indirect access require the account owners or application teams to perform authorized remediations in their AWS accounts with tactical guidance from the incident response team acting as security experts. This method is a slower and more complex way to execute tasks, but it can be successful when the responders are unfamiliar with the account or cloud environment.

Direct Access

To grant incident responders direct access, customers deploy an AWS IAM role into the AWS accounts that can be assumed by security engineers or incident responders during a security event. The incident responder authenticates either through a normal federated process, or through a special emergency process if the incident impacts your normal authentication process. The permissions you give the incident response IAM role depend on the actions you anticipate the responders to perform.

Alternative Access

If you believe a security event is impacting your security, identity, or communication systems, you may need to seek alternative mechanisms and access to investigate and remediate the impact. By using a new, purpose-built AWS account, your responders can collaborate and work from an alternate, secure infrastructure.

For example, responders can leverage new infrastructure launched in the cloud, such as remote workstations via [Amazon WorkSpaces](#) and email services provided by [Amazon WorkMail](#). You'll need to prepare appropriate access controls (via IAM policies) to delegate access so that your secure alternative AWS account can assume permissions into the impacted AWS account.

Once you have delegated appropriate access, you can use the AWS APIs in the affected account to share relevant data, such as logs and volume snapshots, to perform investigative work in the isolated environment. You can learn more about this cross-account access by reading [Tutorial: Delegate Access Across AWS Accounts Using IAM Roles](#).

Automation Access

As you migrate to using automation for responding to security events, you will need to create IAM roles specifically for your automation resources to use (such as Amazon EC2 instances or AWS Lambda functions). Then, these resources can assume the IAM roles and inherit the permissions assigned to the role. Instead of creating and distributing AWS credentials, you delegate permission to your AWS Lambda function or Amazon EC2 instance. The AWS resource automatically receives a set of temporary credentials and uses them to sign API requests.

Additionally, consider a secure method for your automation or tooling to authenticate and execute within the operating system of your Amazon EC2 instance. Although there are plenty of tools that can perform this automation, consider using the [AWS Systems](#)

[Manager Run Command](#), which enables you to remotely and securely administrate instances via an agent that you install on your Amazon EC2 instance operating system.

The AWS Systems Manager Agent (SSM Agent) is installed by default on some Amazon EC2 Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), such as for Windows Server and Amazon Linux. However, you may need to manually install the agent on other versions of Linux and hybrid instances. Whether you use Run Command or another tool, go through any prerequisite setup and configuration before you receive your first security-related alert to investigate.

Managed Services Access

Your organization may already be partnered with an information technology provider that manages services and solutions on your behalf. These partners have a shared responsibility in supporting the security of your organization, and it's important to clearly understand this relationship before an anomaly occurs. Whether you already work with an [AWS Managed Service Provider \(MSP\) Partner](#), or AWS Managed Services, or a managed security services partner, you must identify the responsibilities of each partner as they relate to your cloud environments, what access the providers already have to your cloud services, what access they need, and points-of-contact or escalation paths for when you need their assistance. Finally, you should practice this with your partner to ensure that your response plans are predictable and successful.

For example, AWS Managed Services (AMS) provides ongoing management of your AWS infrastructure so that you can focus on your applications. By implementing best practices to maintain your infrastructure, AWS Managed Services helps to reduce your operational overhead and risk. AWS Managed Services automates common activities such as change requests, monitoring, patch management, security, and backup services, and provides full-lifecycle services to provision, run, and support your infrastructure.

As an Infrastructure Operator, AMS takes responsibility for deploying a suite of security detective controls and providing first line response to them, 24/7 using a follow-the-sun model. When an alert is triggered, AMS follows a standard set of runbooks to ensure a consistent response. These runbooks are shared with AMS customers during onboarding, so they can develop and coordinate response with AMS. AMS encourages the joint execution of security response simulations with customers to develop operational muscle before a real incident occurs.

Prepare Processes

Once appropriate access has been provisioned and tested, your incident response team must define and prepare the related processes necessary for investigation and remediation. This stage is effort intensive, as you will need to sufficiently plan the appropriate response to security events within your cloud environments.

Work closely with your internal cloud services teams and partners to identify the tasks required to ensure that these processes are possible. Collaborate or assign each other response activity tasks and ensure necessary account configurations are in place. We recommend preparing processes and prerequisite configurations in advance to give your organization the following response capabilities.

Decision Trees

Sometimes, different conditions may require different actions or steps. For example, you may take different actions based on the type of AWS account (development versus production), the tags of the resources, the AWS Config Rules compliance status of those resources, or other inputs.

To support you in the creation and documentation of these decisions, we recommend you draft a decision tree with your other teams and stakeholders. Similar to a flow chart, a decision tree is a tool that can be leveraged to support decision making, helping to guide you to determine the optimal actions and outcomes based on potential conditions and inputs, including probabilities.

Use Alternative Accounts

Although responding to an event in the impacted account may be required, it is ideal to investigate data outside of the affected account. Some customers have a process for creating separate, isolated AWS account environments, using templates that preconfigure the resources they must provision. These templates are deployed through a service, such as AWS CloudFormation or Terraform, which provides an easy way to create a collection of related AWS resources and provision them in an orderly and predictable fashion.

Preconfiguring these accounts using templated mechanisms helps to remove human interactions during the initial stages of an incident and ensure the environment and resources are prepared in a repeatable and predictable manner, which can be verified by an audit. In addition, this mechanism also increases the ability to maintain security and containment of data in the forensics environment.

This approach requires you to work with your cloud services and architect teams to determine an appropriate AWS account process that can be used for investigations. For example, your cloud services teams could use [AWS Organizations](#) to generate new accounts and assist you in preconfiguring those accounts using a templated or scripted method.

View or Copy Data

Responders require access to logs or other evidence to analyze and must ensure that they have the ability to view or copy data. At a minimum, the IAM permission policy for the responders should provide read-only access so that they can investigate. You may consider some pre-built AWS Managed Policies, such as [SecurityAudit](#) or [ViewOnlyAccess](#), for enabling appropriate access.

As an example, responders may want to make a point-in-time copy of data, such as the AWS CloudTrail logs, from an Amazon S3 bucket in one account to another account. The permissions provided by the `ReadOnlyAccess` managed policy, for example, would enable the responder to perform these actions. To understand how to use the AWS Command Line Interface (CLI) to perform this, see [How can I copy objects between Amazon S3 buckets](#).

Sharing Amazon EBS snapshots

Many customers use Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) snapshots as part of their investigation for security events that involve their Amazon EC2 instances. Snapshots of Amazon EBS volumes are incremental backups. For more information about how the Amazon EBS incremental snapshots work, visit the [Amazon EBS Snapshots documentation](#) webpage.

To perform an investigation of an Amazon EBS volume in a separate, isolated account, you must modify the permissions of the snapshot to share it with the AWS accounts that you specify. Users that you have authorized can use the snapshots you share as the basis for creating their own EBS volumes, while your original snapshot remains unaffected. For more information, see [Sharing an Amazon EBS Snapshot](#).

If your snapshot is encrypted, you must also share the custom KMS Customer Managed Key (CMK) used to encrypt the snapshot. You can apply cross-account permissions to a custom CMK either when it is created or at a later time. Snapshots are constrained to the region in which they were created, but you can share a snapshot with another region by copying the snapshot to that region. For more information about copying a snapshot, see [Copying an Amazon EBS Snapshot](#).

Sharing Amazon CloudWatch Logs

Logs that are recorded within Amazon CloudWatch Logs, such as Amazon VPC flow logs, can be shared with another account (such as your centralized security account) through a CloudWatch Logs subscription. For example, the log event data can be read from a centralized Amazon Kinesis stream to perform custom processing and analysis. Custom processing is especially useful when you collect logging data from across many accounts. Ideally, create this configuration early in your cloud journey, before a security-related event occurs. For more information, see [Cross-Account Log Data Sharing with Subscriptions](#).

Use Immutable Storage

When copying logs and other evidence to an alternative account, ensure that the replicated data is protected. However, in addition to protecting the secondary evidence, you must protect the integrity of the data at the source. Known as *immutable* storage, these mechanisms ensure data integrity by preventing the data from being tampered or deleted.

Using the native features of Amazon S3, you can configure an Amazon S3 bucket to protect the integrity of your data. By managing access permissions with S3 bucket policies, configuring S3 versioning, and enabling [MFA Delete](#), you can restrict how data can be written or read. This type of configuration is useful for storing investigation logs and evidence, and is often referred to as write once, read many (WORM). Further, you can protect the data by using server-side encryption with AWS Key Management Service (KMS) and ensuring only appropriate IAM principals are authorized to decrypt the data.

Additionally, if you want to securely keep data in a long-term storage after the investigation is completed, consider moving the data from Amazon S3 to [Amazon S3 Glacier](#) using object lifecycle policies. Amazon S3 Glacier is a secure, durable, and extremely low-cost cloud storage service for data archiving and long-term backup. It is designed to deliver 99.999999999% durability, and provides comprehensive security and compliance capabilities that can help meet even the most stringent regulatory requirements.

Moreover, you can protect the data in Amazon S3 Glacier by using the [Amazon S3 Glacier Vault Lock](#), which allows you to easily deploy and enforce compliance controls for individual Amazon S3 Glacier vaults with a vault lock policy. You can specify security controls, such as WORM, in a vault lock policy and lock the policy from future edits. Once locked, the policy can no longer be changed. Amazon S3 Glacier enforces the

controls set in the vault lock policy to help achieve your compliance objectives, such as for data retention. You can deploy a variety of compliance controls in a vault lock policy using the AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policy language.

Launch Resources Near the Event

For responders who are new to the cloud, it is tempting to try to conduct cloud investigations on-premises where you have your existing tools. In AWS experience, customers who respond to incidents using cloud technologies achieve better results— isolations can be automated, copies can be made more easily, evidence is ready for analysis sooner, and the analysis can be completed faster.

The best practice is to perform investigations and forensics in the cloud, where the data is, rather than attempting to transfer the data to a data center before investigating. You can use the secure compute and storage capabilities of the cloud practically anywhere in the world to perform the secure response operations. Many customers choose to pre-build a separate AWS account that is ready to perform an investigation, though there may be cases where you choose to operate your analysis in the same AWS account. If your organization is expected to retain records or proof of criminal activity, then it may be prudent to maintain separate accounts for long-term storage and legal activities.

It is also a best practice to perform the investigation in the same AWS Region where the event occurred, rather than replicating the data to another AWS Region. We recommend this practice primarily because of the additional time required to transfer the data between regions. For each AWS Region you choose to operate in, ensure that both your incident response process and the responders abide by the relevant data privacy laws. If you do need to move data between AWS Regions, consider the legal implications of moving data between jurisdictions. It is generally a best practice to keep the data within the same national jurisdiction.

If you believe a security event is impacting your security, identity, or communication systems, you may need to seek alternative mechanisms and access to investigate and remediate the impact. AWS offers you the ability to quickly launch new infrastructure that can be used for secure, alternate work environments. For example, while investigating the potential severity of the situation, you may want to create a new AWS account with the secure tools for your legal counsel, public relations, and security teams to communicate and continue working. Services such as AWS WorkSpaces (for virtual desktops), AWS WorkMail (for e-mail), and AWS Chime (for communication) can provide your response teams, leadership, and other participants with the capabilities and connectivity they need to communicate, investigate, and remediate an issue.

Isolate Resources

In the course of your investigation, you may need to isolate resources as part of your response to a security anomaly. The intention behind isolating resources is to limit the blast radius of potential impact, prevent further propagation of affected resources, limit the unintended exposure of data, and prevent further unauthorized access.

As with any response, other business, regulatory, legal, or other considerations may apply. Make sure to weigh your intended actions against expected and unexpected consequences. If your cloud teams use resource tags, these tags can help you identify the criticality of the resource or the owner to contact.

Launch Forensic Workstations

Some of your incident response may involve analyzing disk images, file systems, RAM dumps, or other artifacts that are involved in an incident. Many customers build a customized forensic workstation that they can use to mount copies of any affected data volumes (called EBS snapshots). To do so, follow some general basic steps:

1. Choose a base Amazon Machine Image (AMI) (e.g. Linux or Windows operating system) that can be used as a forensic workstation.
2. Launch an EC2 instance from that base AMI.
3. Harden the operating system, remove unnecessary software packages, and configure relevant auditing and logging mechanisms.
4. Install your preferred suite of open source or private toolkits, as well as any vendor software and packages you need.
5. Stop the EC2 instance, and create a new AMI from the stopped instance.
6. Create a weekly or monthly process to update and rebuild the AMI with latest software patches.

Once the forensic system is provisioned using an AMI, your incident response team can use this instance to create a new AMI to launch a new forensic workstation for each investigation. The process for launching the AMI as an EC2 instance can be preconfigured to simplify the deployment process. For example, you can template the forensic infrastructure resources you need within a text file and deploy it into your AWS account through AWS CloudFormation.

Templating the resources means your well-trained forensic experts are able to use new forensic workstations for each investigation, rather than having to reuse infrastructure. This process ensures there is no cross-contamination from other forensic examinations.

Instance Types for Workstations

Amazon EC2 provides a wide selection of instance types optimized to fit different use cases. Instance types comprise varying combinations of CPU, memory, storage, and networking capacity and give you the flexibility to choose the appropriate mix of resources for your applications. Each instance type includes one or more instance sizes, allowing you to scale your resources to the requirements of your target workload.

AWS enhanced networking uses single root I/O virtualization (SR-IOV) to provide high-performance networking capabilities on [supported instance types](#). SR-IOV is a method of device virtualization that provides higher I/O performance and lower CPU utilization when compared to traditional virtualized network interfaces. Enhanced networking provides higher bandwidth, higher packet per second (PPS) performance, and consistently lower inter-instance latencies. There is no additional charge for using enhanced networking. To find out which instance types support 10 or 25 Gbps network speeds, as well as other advanced capabilities, see [Amazon EC2 Instance Types](#).

Cloud Provider Support

AWS Support

[AWS Support](#) offers a range of plans that provide access to tools and expertise that support the success and operational health of your AWS solutions. All support plans provide 24x7 access to customer service, AWS documentation, whitepapers, and support forums. If you need technical support and more resources to help plan, deploy, and optimize your AWS environment, you can select a support plan that best aligns with your AWS use case.

You should consider the [Support Center](#) in the AWS Console as the central point of contact when engaging support for issues that affect your AWS resources. Access to AWS Support is controlled by AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). For more information about granting access to AWS support features, see [Accessing Support](#).

If you need to report abuse of Amazon EC2, contact the AWS Abuse team using this page: <https://aws.amazon.com/forms/report-abuse>

DDoS Response Support

A Denial of Service (DoS) attack makes your website or application unavailable to end users. Attackers use a variety of techniques that consume network or other resources, disrupting access for legitimate end users. In its simplest form, a DoS attack against a target is executed by a lone attacker from a single source.

In a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, an attacker uses multiple sources, which may be compromised or controlled by a group of collaborators, to orchestrate an attack against a target. In a DDoS attack, each of the collaborators or compromised hosts participates in the attack, generating a flood of packets or requests to overwhelm the intended target.

AWS offers customers [AWS Shield](#), which provides a managed DDoS protection service that safeguards web applications running on AWS. AWS Shield provides always-on detection and automatic inline mitigations that minimize application downtime and latency, so there is no need to engage AWS Support to benefit from DDoS protection. There are two tiers of AWS Shield: Standard and Advanced.

All AWS customers benefit from the automatic protections of AWS Shield Standard, at no additional charge. AWS Shield Standard defends against most common, frequently occurring network and transport layer DDoS attacks that target your website or applications. When you use AWS Shield Standard with Amazon CloudFront and Amazon Route 53, you receive comprehensive availability protection against all known infrastructure (Layer 3 and 4) attacks.

For higher levels of protection against attacks targeting your web applications running on [Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud \(Amazon EC2\)](#), [Elastic Load Balancing \(ELB\)](#), [Amazon CloudFront](#), and [Amazon Route 53](#) resources, you can subscribe to AWS Shield Advanced. Additionally, AWS Shield Advanced gives you 24x7 access to the AWS DDoS Response Team (DRT). You can learn more about AWS Shield Standard and AWS Shield Advanced by visiting the [AWS Shield web page](#).

Simulate

Security Incident Response Simulations

Security Incident Response Simulations (SIRS) are internal events that provide a structured opportunity to practice your incident response plan and procedures during a realistic scenario. SIRS events are fundamentally about being prepared and iteratively

improving your response capabilities. Customers have expressed the following reasons why they find value in performing SIRS activities, including:

- Validating readiness
- Developing confidence – learning from simulations and train staff
- Following compliance or contractual obligations
- Generating artifacts for accreditation
- Being agile - incremental improvement with laser focus
- Becoming faster and improving tools
- Refining communication and escalation
- Developing comfort with the rare and the unexpected

For these reasons, the value derived from participating in a SIRS activity increases an organization's effectiveness during stressful events. Developing a SIRS activity that is both realistic and beneficial can be a difficult exercise. Although testing your runbooks or automation that handles well-understood events has certain advantages, it is just as valuable to participate in creative SIRS activities to test yourself against the unexpected.

Simulation Steps

Regardless if you design your own SIRS, or lean on a trusted partner to provide the groundwork, simulations generally follow these steps:

1. Find an issue of importance—define the trigger that should cause a response.
2. Identify skilled security engineers—a simulation requires a builder and a tester.
3. Build a realistic model system—the simulation must be realistic and appropriate. If it is not realistic, participants may not value the exercise, whereas if it is too minimal, the exercise may be deemed trivial. In the beginning, start with simple exercises, and work towards a full event.
4. Build and test the scenario elements—relevant simulation material may need to be built, such as logging artifacts, email notifications and alerts, and potential runbooks.

5. Invite other security individuals and cross-organizational participants—invite everyone who needs to train and participate. If your general legal counsel, executives, and public relations have a part in the simulation, you should invite them as well.
6. Run the simulation—choose if your staff should expect the SIRS event, or if the simulation should remain unannounced.
7. Celebrate, measure, improve, and repeat—the simulation has factors of stress, and so it is important to encourage and celebrate the participants' efforts. After encouragement comes the opportunity to measure, improve, and iterate for the next simulation. AWS encourages you to make a habit of these activities.

Important: If you are planning to perform a Security Incident Response Simulation, first confirm that the SIRS event does not violate the AWS Acceptable Use Policy. If you intend to perform penetration testing or scanning activities, contact AWS to obtain permission. You can contact AWS to request authorization for a simulated event by visiting the AWS Penetration Testing web page and locating the Other Simulated Events section.

Simulation Examples

Security simulations must be realistic to provide the expected value. When you or your partners work toward creating your own simulations, always consider past, real-world events as a valuable source for potential simulation exercises. Here are a few examples that AWS customers have found useful to use for their initial simulations:

- Unauthorized changes to network configuration or resources
- Credentials that were mistakenly exposed publicly due to developer misconfiguration
- Sensitive content that was mistakenly made publicly-accessible due to developer misconfiguration
- Isolation of a web server that is communicating with suspected malicious IP addresses

In addition to the valuable experiential learning, performing SIRS activities generates outputs, such as lessons learned, that you can use as inputs into the next process of your program—iteration.

Iterate

When a security anomaly is detected, containing the event and returning to a known good state are important elements of a response plan. As an example, if the anomaly occurred because of a security misconfiguration, the remediation might be as simple as removing the variance through a re-deployment of the resources with the proper configuration. In this section, we explain how you can leverage the principles, preparation, data sources, and automation to build your own security response capability on AWS.

Runbooks

A runbook is the documented form of an organization's procedures for conducting a task or series of tasks. This documentation is usually stored within an internal digital system or on printed paper. You may currently have IR runbooks, or you may need to create them to be compliant to a security assurance framework. However, humans following written runbooks manually could potentially make mistakes, and it is optimal to shift the burden of repeatable tasks onto automation. Automation frees human responders from common tasks, making them available for more important tasks, such as correlating events, practicing in simulations, devising new response procedures, performing research, developing new skills, and testing or building new tools. However, writing a runbook is generally the first place to start, before you can decompose the tasks into programmable logic and iterate towards proper automation.

Creating Runbooks

To create runbooks for the cloud, we recommend that you first focus on the alerts you currently generate. If you are generating an alert, it is ideally accompanied by an investigation. Start by defining the manual descriptions of the processes you perform. After this, test the processes and iterate on the runbook pattern to improve the core logic of your response. Determine what the exceptions are, and what the alternative resolutions are for those scenarios. For example, you may want to terminate a misconfigured EC2 instance in a development environment, but if the same event occurred in production, you may want to only stop the instance and verify with the rest of the organization that critical data will not be lost and that termination is acceptable.

Once suitable, this logic can then be decomposed into a code-based solution, and can be used as a tool by many responders to automate the response and remove variance or guess-work by responders. This speeds up the lifecycle of a response. The next goal

is to enable this code to be fully automated by being invoked by the alerts or events themselves, rather than them being executed by a human responder.

Getting Started

If you're not sure where to start, consider beginning with the alerts that could be generated by [AWS Trusted Advisor](#) and [AWS Config Rules](#). Then, progress further, focusing on events generated by [Amazon GuardDuty](#) and [Amazon Macie](#). The documentation for Amazon GuardDuty findings are available on the [Amazon GuardDuty documentation page](#), whereas the Amazon Macie alerts are available via the Amazon Macie service in the AWS Management Console.

Both Amazon GuardDuty and Amazon Macie send notifications via Amazon CloudWatch Events when any change in the findings or alerts takes place. This includes newly generated alerts and updates to existing alerts. You can set up the Amazon CloudWatch Events rules to trigger AWS Lambda functions to perform event-driven response. For more information, see the [Event-driven Response](#) section.

Automation

Automation is a force multiplier, scaling the responders' efforts to match the speed of the organization. Moving away from manual processes to automated processes enables you to spend more time focusing on measures to increase the security of your AWS cloud environment.

Automating Incident Response

AWS customers can automate security engineering and operations functions using a comprehensive set of APIs and tools. Identity management, network security, data protection, and monitoring capabilities can be fully automated and delivered using popular software development methods you already have in place. When you build security automation, your system can monitor, review, and initiate a response, rather than having people monitor your security position and react to an event manually.

Your incident response team runs the risk of alert fatigue if they continually respond to the same alerts in the same way. Over time, the team may become desensitized to alerts and can either make mistakes handling ordinary situations or miss unusual alerts. Automation helps avoid alert fatigue by using functions that process the repetitive and ordinary alerts, leaving humans to handle the sensitive and unique incidents.

You can improve manual processes by programmatically automating steps in the process. Once you define the remediation pattern to an event, you can decompose that pattern into actionable logic, and write the code to perform the logic. The code could then be executed by a responder to remediate the issue. Over time, more and more steps become automated, and ultimately whole classes of common incidents are handled automatically.

However, the objective should be to further reduce the time gap between detective mechanisms and responsive mechanisms. Historically, this time gap can take hours, days, or even months. An [Incident Response survey by SANS in 2016](#) found that 21% of respondents stated their time to detection took two to seven days, and only 29% of respondents were able to remediate events within the same time frame. In the cloud, you can shrink that response time gap to seconds by building event-driven response capabilities.

Event-Driven Response

Event-driven response is a system where a detective mechanism triggers a responsive mechanism to automatically remediate the event. You can use event-driven response capabilities to reduce the time-to-value between detective mechanisms and responsive mechanisms. To create this event-driven architecture, we provide an example using AWS Lambda. AWS Lambda is a serverless compute service that runs your code in response to events and automatically manages the underlying compute resources for you.

Event-Driven Response Example with AWS Lambda

First, assume that you have an AWS account with the AWS CloudTrail service enabled. If AWS CloudTrail is ever disabled (via the `cloudtrail:StopLogging` API), the response procedure is to turn the service back on and investigate the principal that disabled the AWS CloudTrail logging. Instead of performing these steps manually in the AWS Management Console web interface, you can programmatically re-enable the logging (via the `cloudtrail:StartLogging` API). If you implement this with code, your response objective is to perform this task as quickly as possible and notify the responders that the response was performed.

You can decompose the logic into simple code to run within an AWS Lambda function to perform these tasks. You can then use Amazon CloudWatch Events to monitor for the specific `cloudtrail:StopLogging` event, and invoke the function if it happens. When this AWS Lambda responder function is invoked by Amazon CloudWatch Events, you can pass it the specific event's detail that contains the information of the principal

that disabled CloudTrail, when it was disabled, the specific AWS CloudTrail resource that was affected, and so on. You can use this information to essentially perform a log dive, and then generate a notification or alert with just the specific values that a response analyst would require.

Ideally, the goal of event-driven response is for the Lambda responder function to perform the response tasks and then notify the responder that the anomaly has been successfully resolved with any pertinent contextual information. It is then up to the human responder to decide how to follow-up on why it occurred and how future reoccurrences might be prevented. This feedback loop drives further security improvement into your cloud environments. Achieving this objective requires you to shift to a culture of security working closer with development and operations teams.

Incident Response Examples

Service Domain Incidents

This section focuses on service domain incidents that you handle exclusively via AWS APIs.

Identities

Amazon Web Services provides APIs to cloud services that are used by millions of customers to build new applications and drive business outcomes. These APIs can be invoked through many ways, such as by software development kits (SDKs), the AWS CLI, and the AWS Management Console. To interact with AWS through these methods, the AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) service helps you securely control access to AWS resources. You use IAM to control who is authenticated (signed in) and authorized (has permissions) to use resources at the Account Level. For a list of AWS services that work with IAM, see [AWS Services That Work with IAM](#).

When you first create an AWS account, you begin with a single sign-on (SSO) identity that has complete access to all AWS services and resources in the account. This identity is called the AWS account root user and is accessed by signing in with the email address and password that you used to create the account. We strongly recommend that you do not use the root user for your everyday tasks, even the administrative ones. Instead, adhere to the [best practice of using the root user only to create your first IAM user](#). Securely lock away the root user credentials and use them to perform only a few account and service management tasks.

Although these APIs provide value to millions of customers, some of them can be abused if the wrong individuals acquire access to your IAM or root credentials. For example, you can use the APIs to enable logging within your account, such as AWS CloudTrail. However, if your credentials fall into the wrong hands, an attacker may be able to also use the API to disable these logs. You can prevent abuse of this nature by configuring appropriate IAM permissions that follow a least privilege model, and by properly protecting your IAM credentials. See the [IAM Best Practices documentation page](#) to learn more. If this example event does occur, there are multiple detective controls to identify that your AWS CloudTrail logging was disabled, such as AWS CloudTrail itself, AWS Config, AWS Trusted Advisor, and AWS CloudWatch Events.

Resources

Other features that can be abused or misconfigured vary from organization to organization based on how each customer operates in the cloud. For example, some organizations intend to make certain data or applications publicly accessible, whereas others keep their applications and data internal and confidential. Not all security events are malicious in nature, as you may also respond to unintentional or improper configurations. Consider which APIs or features have a high impact to your organization, and if they are frequently or infrequently used.

The following are some examples of features that could be abused or configured inappropriately:

- An Amazon S3 bucket containing sensitive data could have permissions that make it publicly accessible or accessible to unauthorized users.
- An Amazon SNS topic could have a policy that allows anyone to publish to it.
- An Amazon EBS snapshot could be shared to an unauthorized account.
- An AWS IAM role could have a trust policy that allows anyone to assume it.
- A VPC Security Group could have a rule added that allows all traffic inbound.

Many security misconfigurations can quickly be identified using tools and services. AWS Trusted Advisor provides a number of checks for best practices. Further, partners within the AWS Partner Network (APN) offer hundreds of industry-leading products that are equivalent, identical to, or integrate with existing controls in your on-premises environments. A number of these products and solutions have been pre-qualified by the [AWS Partner Competency Program](#). We encourage you to visit the [Configuration and Vulnerability Analysis](#) section of the APN Security Competency program to browse these solutions and to determine if they can satisfy your requirements.

Directive controls establish the governance, risk, and compliance models within which the environment operates. These directive controls help you define what a secure configuration that meets your business objectives is and what it is not. You can then configure your preventative controls, such as AWS IAM, to prevent the directive control from being violated. After this, you can enable the detective controls, such as AWS CloudTrail and AWS Config, to identify if a violation has occurred. Finally, prescribe your responsive control on how you remediate the issue, and use that as a feedback loop to improve on your preventative and detective controls.

Infrastructure Domain Incidents

The infrastructure domain typically includes your application's data or network-related activity, such as the traffic to your Amazon EC2 instances within the VPC, the processes running in your Amazon EC2 instance operating systems, and so on.

For example, assume that your monitoring solution notified you of a potential security anomaly on your Amazon EC2 instance. The following are common steps taken to address this issue:

1. **Capture** the metadata about the EC2 instance, before any environment changes are made.
2. **Protect** the EC2 instance from accidental termination, by [enabling termination protection on the instance](#).
3. **Isolate** the EC2 instance by switching the VPC Security Group or explicitly denying network traffic to the instance's IP address via the Network Access Control List.
4. **Detach** the EC2 instance from any [AWS Auto Scaling groups](#).
5. **Deregister** the EC2 instance from any related [Elastic Load Balancing](#) service.
6. **Snapshot** the Amazon EBS data volumes that are attached to the EC2 instance for preservation and follow-up investigations.
7. **Tag** the EC2 instance that it has been quarantined for investigation, and add any pertinent metadata, such as the trouble ticket associated with the investigation.

Note that all of the preceding steps can be performed using the AWS APIs, AWS SDKs, the AWS CLI, and the AWS Management Console (via your web browser). To interact with AWS via these methods, the AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) web service helps you securely control access to AWS resources. You use IAM to control who is authenticated (signed in) and authorized (has permissions) to use resources at

the Account Level. The AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) service is what provides the authentication and authorization for you to perform these actions and interact with the service domain.

A snapshot of an EBS volume is a point-in-time, block-level copy of an EBS data volume, which occurs asynchronously and may take time to complete. New EBS volumes can be created from these copies and mounted to the forensic EC2 instance for deep analysis offline by forensic investigators. The following diagram represents a basic visual depiction of the outcome, though it has been simplified and does not describe the full network components involved (such as subnets, routing tables, and network access control lists):




Figure 3: EC2 Instance Isolation and Snapshots

Investigation Decisions

At this point, customers choose between an offline investigation (immediately shutting down the instance) or an online investigation (keeping the instance running). One advantage to the offline investigation is that once the instance is shut down, it can no longer affect the existing environment. Additionally, you can create a copy of the affected instance from the EBS snapshots into an isolated AWS account with an isolated environment designed specifically for your investigative purposes. However, some customers choose to not immediately shut down the instance, as an “online”

investigation enables them to potentially capture volatile evidence from the host operating system itself, such as memory or network traffic.

Capturing Volatile Data

Although not all customers choose to perform the online investigation, it is important to understand the necessary mechanisms to capture volatile data from an instance. An online investigation requires interaction with your operating system running on the Amazon EC2 instance. In this scenario, you need more than the AWS IAM service to execute tasks on an Amazon EC2 instance. Although you could authenticate directly to the machine using a standard method, such as Linux secure shell (SSH), or Windows remote desktop (RDP), manual interaction with the operating system is not a best practice. To execute tasks on a host, use an automation tool programmatically.

Using AWS Systems Manager

The [AWS Systems Manager Run Command](#) helps you remotely and securely perform on-demand changes running Linux shell scripts and Windows PowerShell commands on a targeted instance (one or many). Although you can invoke Run Command through permissions in the AWS IAM service, you must activate your EC2 instances as managed instances, install the SSM Agent on your machines (if not installed by default), and configure the AWS IAM permissions. If you are interested in using Run Command for automation or response activities, complete the prerequisite activities before an investigation is required.

Systems Manager, which includes Run Command, is integrated with AWS CloudTrail, a service that captures API calls made by or on behalf of Systems Manager and delivers the log files to an Amazon S3 bucket that you specify. Using the information collected by AWS CloudTrail, you can determine what request was made, the source IP address from which the request was made, who made the request, when it was made, and more. CloudTrail logs all Systems Manager API actions, including API requests to execute commands using Run Command or to create Systems Manager documents.

You can use the AWS Systems Manager Run Command service to invoke the SSM Agent to execute Linux shell scripts and Windows PowerShell commands. These scripts could load and execute specific tools to capture additional data from the host, such as the Linux Memory Extractor (LiME) kernel module. You can then transfer the memory capture to your forensic EC2 instance within the VPC network, or to an Amazon S3 bucket for durable storage.

Automating the Capture

One method of invoking the SSM Agent is to target Run Command through Amazon CloudWatch Events when the instance is tagged with a specific tag. For example, tagging an affected instance with the tag `Response=Isolate+MemoryCapture` could be configured in Amazon CloudWatch Events to trigger two actions: (1) a Lambda function that performs the isolation activities, and (2) a Run Command that executes a shell command to export the Linux memory via the SSM Agent. This tag-driven response is another form of event-driven response.

Summary

In this paper, we defined the concepts of security incident response within your AWS environment, reviewed the controls and capabilities at your disposal, and reviewed some topical examples for remediating these issues. In addition, we've reviewed how customers can start small and iterate, moving toward the adoption of automation capabilities that improve the speed of response.

Many AWS customers have expanded the role of their security teams to build custom security features and services for their organization to use. Their goal is to assist the organization through their cloud journey by building custom security services or capabilities that can be consumed by other teams, or that protect the business holistically. A security team that can help the business move faster while being safer, will help drive the business outcomes and goals that the organization is trying to achieve.

Working closely with your cloud teams and stakeholders, we encourage you to seek out opportunities to incorporate security into every aspect of your development and architecture process, such as deploying automation capabilities that make detective controls and responsive actions simpler and faster. This will enable you to begin transforming your organization's development culture towards a culture of "DevSecOps" – integrating development teams, security teams, and operations teams together, working as one team toward business objectives. With such a culture, you'll be better prepared for when security events occur.

Additional Resources

For additional information, see the following:

- [AWS Security Best Practices](#)

- [Security Perspective of the AWS Cloud Adoption Framework \(CAF\)](#)
- [AWS Centralized Logging Solution](#)
- [Visualize AWS Cloudtrail Logs using AWS Glue and Amazon QuickSight blog post](#)
- [How to Visualize and Refine Your Network's Security by Adding Security Group IDs to Your VPC Flow Logs](#)
- [How to Monitor Host-Based Intrusion Detection System Alerts on Amazon EC2 Instances](#)
- [Store and Monitor OS & Application Log Files with Amazon CloudWatch](#)
- [Managing S3 Access Permissions](#)
- [S3 Versioning](#)
- [Using MFA Delete](#)
- [Using Server-Side Encryption with KMS](#)

Media

- [AWS re:Invent 2014 \(SEC402\): Intrusion Detection in the Cloud](#)
- [AWS re:Invent 2014 \(SEC404\): Incident Response in the Cloud](#)
- [AWS re:Invent 2015 \(SEC308\): Wrangling Security Events in The Cloud](#)
- [AWS re:Invent 2015 \(SEC316\): Harden Your Architecture with Security Incident Response Simulations](#)
- [AWS re:Invent 2016 \(SEC313\): Automating Security Event Response, from Idea to Code to Execution](#)
- [AWS re:Invent 2017 \(SID302\): Force Multiply Your Security Team with Automation and Alexa](#)
- [AWS re:Invent 2016 \(SAC316\): Security Automation: Spend Less Time Securing Your Applications](#)
- [AWS re:Invent 2016 \(SAC304\): Predictive Security: Using Big Data to Fortify Your Defenses](#)
- [AWS re:Invent 2017 \(SID325\): Amazon Macie: Data Visibility Powered by Machine Learning for Security and Compliance Workloads](#)

Third-Party Tools

Note that the following third-party links are external and are not endorsed by AWS. AWS offers no guarantees or representations of any kind about the tools or the webpages that are linked here.

- [AWS_IR](#): Python installable command line utility for mitigation of host and key compromises.
- [MargaritaShotgun](#): Remote Memory Acquisition Tool
- [ThreatPrep](#): Python module for evaluation of AWS account best practices around incident handling readiness.
- [ThreatResponse Web](#): Web based analysis platform for use with the AWS_IR command line tool.
- [GRR Rapid Response](#): Remote live forensics for incident response
- [Linux Write Blocker](#): The kernel patch and userspace tools to enable Linux software write blocking

Industry References

- [NIST SP 800-61R2: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide](#)

Appendix A: Examples

Example AWS CloudTrail Event

The following example shows that an IAM user named Alice used the AWS CLI to call the Amazon EC2 `StopInstances` action by using `ec2-stop-instances`.

```
{
  "Records": [
    {
      "eventVersion": "1.0",
      "userIdentity": {
        "type": "IAMUser",
        "principalId": "EX_PRINCIPAL_ID",
        "arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/Alice",
        "accountId": "123456789012",
        "accessKeyId": "EXAMPLE_KEY_ID",
        "userName": "Alice"
      },
      "eventTime": "2014-03-06T21:01:59Z",
      "eventSource": "ec2.amazonaws.com",
      "eventName": "StopInstances",
      "awsRegion": "us-east-2",
      "sourceIPAddress": "205.251.233.176",
      "userAgent": "ec2-api-tools 1.6.12.2",
      "requestParameters": {
        "instancesSet": {
          "items": [
            {
              "instanceId": "i-ebeaf9e2"
            }
          ]
        },
        "force": false
      },
      "responseElements": {
        "instancesSet": {
          "items": [
            {
              "instanceId": "i-ebeaf9e2",
              "currentState": {
                "code": 64,
                "name": "stopping"
              },
              "previousState": {
                "code": 16,
                "name": "running"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

Example AWS CloudWatch Event

The following Amazon CloudWatch Event example shows that an AWS IAM user named "jane-roe-test" was found publicly exposed on www.github.com, and could be abused by unauthorized users.

```
{
  "check-name": "Exposed Access Keys",
  "check-item-detail": {
    "Case ID": "02648f3b-e18f-4019-8d68-ce25efe080ff",
    "Usage (USD per Day)": "0",
    "User Name (IAM or Root)": "jane-roe-test",
    "Deadline": "1440453299248",
    "Access Key ID": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
    "Time Updated": "1440021299248",
    "Fraud Type": "Exposed",
    "Location": "www.github.com"
  },
  "status": "ERROR",
  "resource_id": "",
  "uuid": "cce6d28f-e44b-4e61-aba1-5b4af96a0f59"
}
```

Example Infrastructure Domain CLI Activities

The following AWS CLI commands show an example of responding to an event within the infrastructure domain. This example uses the AWS APIs to perform many of the initial incident response activities described in this paper.

```
# Anomaly detected on IP X.X.X.X. Capture that instance's metadata
> aws ec2 describe-instances --filters "Name=ip-
address,Values=X.X.X.X"
```

```
# Protect that instance from accidental termination
> aws ec2 modify-instance-attribute --instance-id i-abcd1234 --
attribute disableApiTermination --value true
```

```
# Switch the EC2 instance's Security Group to a restricted Security Group
> aws ec2 modify-instance-attribute --instance-id i-abcd1234 --groups sg-a1b2c3d4
```

```
# Detach from the Auto Scaling Group
> aws autoscaling detach-instances --instance-ids i-abcd1234 --auto-scaling-group-name web-asg
```

```
# Deregister the instance from the Elastic Load Balancer
> aws elb deregister-instances-from-load-balancer --instances i-abcd1234 --load-balancer-name web-load-balancer
```

```
# Create an EBS snapshot
> aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume vol-12xxxx78 --description "ResponderName-Date-REFERENCE-ID"
```

```
# Create a new EC2 instance from the Forensic Workstation AMI
> aws ec2 run-instances --image-id ami-4n6x4n6x --count 1 --instance-type c4.8xlarge --key-name forensicPublicKey --security-group-ids sg-1a2b3c4d --subnet-id subnet-6e7f819e
```

```
# Create a new EBS volume copy from the EBS snapshot
> aws ec2 create-volume --region us-east-1 --availability-zone us-east-1a --snapshot-id snap-abcd1234 --volume-type io1 --iops 10000
```

```
# Attach the volume to the forensic workstation
> aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-1234abcd --instance-id i-
new4n6x --device /dev/sdf
```

```
# Create a security group rule to allow the new Forensic
Workstation to communicate to the contaminated instance.
> aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress --group-id sg-a1b2c3d4 -
-protocol tcp --port 0-65535 --source-group sg-1a2b3c4d
```

```
# Tag the contaminated instance with the ticket or reference ID
> aws ec2 create-tags -resources i-abcd1234 -tags
Key=Environment,Value=Quarantine:REFERENCE-ID
```

Appendix B: Cloud Capability Definitions

Amazon Web Services offers well over 150 cloud services and thousands of features to customers. Many of these provide native detective, preventative, and responsive capabilities, whereas others can be used to architect custom security solutions. This section includes a subset of those services that pertain the most to incident response in the cloud.

Logging and Events

AWS CloudTrail: AWS CloudTrail is a service that enables governance, compliance, operational auditing, and risk auditing of your AWS account. With CloudTrail, you can log, continuously monitor, and retain account activity related to actions across your AWS infrastructure. CloudTrail provides event history of your AWS account activity, including actions taken through the AWS Management Console, AWS SDKs, command line tools, and other AWS services. This event history simplifies security analysis, resource change tracking, and troubleshooting.

Validated log files are invaluable in security and forensic investigations. To determine whether a log file was modified, deleted, or unchanged after CloudTrail delivered it, you can use CloudTrail log file integrity validation. This feature is built-in using industry standard algorithms: SHA-256 for hashing and SHA-256 with RSA for digital signing. This makes it computationally infeasible to modify, delete or forge CloudTrail log files without detection.

By default, the log files delivered by CloudTrail to your bucket are encrypted by Amazon server-side encryption, though you can optionally use the AWS Key Management Service (KMS) managed keys (SSE-KMS) for your CloudTrail log files.

Amazon CloudWatch Events: Amazon CloudWatch Events delivers a near real-time stream of system events that describe changes in AWS resources, or when API calls are published by AWS CloudTrail. Using simple rules that you can quickly set up, you can match events and route them to one or more target functions or streams. CloudWatch Events becomes aware of operational changes as they occur. CloudWatch Events can respond to these operational changes and take corrective action as necessary, by sending messages to respond to the environment, activating functions, making changes, and capturing state information. Some security services, like Amazon GuardDuty, produce their output in the form of CloudWatch Events.

AWS Config: AWS Config is a service that enables you to assess, audit, and evaluate the configurations of your AWS resources. Config continuously monitors and records your AWS resource configurations and allows you to automate the evaluation of recorded configurations against desired configurations. With Config, you can review changes in configurations and relationships between AWS resources—manually or automatically. You can dive into detailed resource configuration histories, and determine your overall compliance against the configurations specified in your internal guidelines. This enables you to simplify compliance auditing, security analysis, change management, and operational troubleshooting.

Amazon S3 Access Logs: If you store sensitive information in an S3 bucket, enable S3 access logs to record every upload, download, and modification to that data. This log is separate from, and in addition to, the CloudTrail logs that record changes to the bucket itself (e.g., changing access policies, lifecycle policies, etc.).

Amazon CloudWatch Logs: You can use Amazon CloudWatch Logs to monitor, store, and access your log files (such as your operating system, application, and custom log files) from your Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instances using the CloudWatch Logs agent. Additionally, Amazon CloudWatch Logs can capture logs from AWS CloudTrail, Route 53 DNS Queries, VPC Flow Logs, Lambda functions, and other sources. You can then retrieve the associated log data from CloudWatch Logs.

Amazon VPC Flow Logs: VPC flow logs enable you to capture information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in your VPC. After you've created a flow log, you can view and retrieve its data in Amazon CloudWatch Logs. VPC flow logs can help you with a number of tasks. For example, you can use flow logs to troubleshoot why specific traffic is not reaching an instance, which in turn can help you diagnose overly restrictive security group rules. You can also use flow logs as a security tool to monitor the traffic that is reaching your instance.

AWS WAF Logs: AWS WAF now supports full logging of all web requests inspected by the service. Customers can store these logs in Amazon S3 for compliance and auditing needs as well as use them for debugging and additional forensics. The logs help customers understand why certain rules are triggered and why certain web requests are blocked. Customers can also integrate the logs with their SIEM and log analysis tools.

Other AWS Logs: With the pace of innovation, we continue to deploy new features and capabilities for customers practically every day. As such, there are dozens of AWS services that provide logging and monitoring capabilities, though it is not the purpose of this document to enumerate each of them. Refer to individual service documentation pages to determine the features that service offers.

Visibility and Alerting

AWS Security Hub: AWS Security Hub gives you a comprehensive view of your high-priority security alerts and compliance status across AWS accounts. With Security Hub, you now have a single place that aggregates, organizes, and prioritizes your security alerts, or findings, from multiple AWS services, such as Amazon GuardDuty, Amazon Inspector, and Amazon Macie, as well as from AWS Partner solutions. Your findings are visually summarized on integrated dashboards with actionable graphs and tables. You can also continuously monitor your environment using automated compliance checks based on the AWS best practices and industry standards your organization follows.

Amazon GuardDuty: Amazon GuardDuty is a managed threat detection service that continuously monitors for malicious or unauthorized behavior to help you protect your AWS accounts and workloads. It monitors for activity such as unusual API calls or potentially unauthorized deployments that indicate a possible account compromise. GuardDuty also detects potentially compromised instances or reconnaissance by attackers.

GuardDuty identifies suspected attackers through integrated threat intelligence feeds and uses machine learning to detect anomalies in account and workload activity. When a potential threat is detected, the service delivers a detailed security alert to the GuardDuty console and AWS CloudWatch Events. This makes alerts actionable and easy to integrate into existing event management and workflow systems.

Amazon Macie: Amazon Macie is an AI-powered security service that helps you prevent data loss by automatically discovering, classifying, and protecting sensitive data stored in AWS. Amazon Macie uses machine learning to recognize sensitive data such as personally identifiable information (PII) or intellectual property, assigns a business value, and provides visibility into where this data is stored and how it is being used in your organization. Amazon Macie continuously monitors data access activity for anomalies, and delivers alerts when it detects risk of unauthorized access or inadvertent data leaks.

AWS Config Rules: An AWS Config Rule represents desired configurations for a resource and is evaluated against configuration changes on the relevant resources, as recorded by AWS Config. The results of evaluating a rule against the configuration of a resource are available on a dashboard. Using Config Rules, you can assess your overall compliance and risk status from a configuration perspective, view compliance trends over time and pinpoint which configuration change caused a resource to drift out of compliance with a rule.

AWS Trusted Advisor: AWS Trusted Advisor is an online resource to help you reduce cost, increase performance, and improve security by optimizing your AWS environment. Trusted Advisor provides real time guidance to help you provision your resources following AWS best practices. The full set of Trusted Advisor checks, including CloudWatch Events integration, is available to Business and Enterprise support plan customers.

Amazon CloudWatch: Amazon CloudWatch is a monitoring service for AWS cloud resources and the applications you run on AWS. You can use Amazon CloudWatch to collect and track metrics, collect and monitor log files, set alarms, and automatically react to changes in your AWS resources. Amazon CloudWatch can monitor AWS resources such as Amazon EC2 instances, Amazon DynamoDB tables, and Amazon RDS DB instances, as well as custom metrics generated by your applications and services, and any log files your applications generate. You can use Amazon CloudWatch to gain system-wide visibility into resource utilization, application performance, and operational health. You can use these insights to react and keep your application running smoothly.

AWS Inspector: Amazon Inspector is an automated security assessment service that helps improve the security and compliance of applications deployed on AWS. Amazon Inspector automatically assesses applications for vulnerabilities or deviations from best practices. After performing an assessment, Amazon Inspector produces a detailed list of security findings prioritized by level of severity. These findings can be reviewed directly or as part of detailed assessment reports which are available via the Amazon Inspector console or API.

Automation

AWS Lambda: AWS Lambda is a serverless compute service that runs your code in response to events and automatically manages the underlying compute resources for you. You can use AWS Lambda to extend other AWS services with custom logic, or create your own back-end services that operate at AWS scale, performance, and security. Lambda runs your code on high-availability compute infrastructure and performs all the administration of the compute resources for you. This includes server and operating system maintenance, capacity provisioning and automatic scaling, code and security patch deployment, and code monitoring and logging. All you need to do is supply the code.

AWS Step Functions: AWS Step Functions makes it easy to coordinate the components of distributed applications and microservices using visual workflows. Step

Functions provides a graphical console to arrange and visualize the components of your application as a series of steps. This makes it simple to build and run multistep applications. Step Functions automatically triggers and tracks each step, and retries when there are errors, so your application executes in order and as expected.

Step Functions logs the state of each step, so when things do go wrong, you can diagnose and debug problems quickly. You can change and add steps without even writing code, so you can easily evolve your application and innovate faster. AWS Step Functions is part of the AWS Serverless Platform, and makes it simple to orchestrate AWS Lambda functions for serverless applications. You can also use Step Functions for microservices orchestration using compute resources such as Amazon EC2 and Amazon ECS.

AWS Systems Manager: AWS Systems Manager gives you visibility and control of your infrastructure on AWS. Systems Manager provides a unified user interface so you can view operational data from multiple AWS services and allows you to automate operational tasks across your AWS resources. With Systems Manager, you can group resources by application, view operational data for monitoring and troubleshooting, and take action on your groups of resources. Systems Manager can keep your instances in their defined state, perform on-demand changes like updating applications or running shell scripts, and perform other automation and patching tasks.

Secure Storage

Amazon S3: Amazon S3 is object storage built to store and retrieve any amount of data from anywhere. It is designed to deliver 99.999999999% durability, and stores data for millions of applications used by market leaders in every industry. S3 provides comprehensive security and compliance capabilities that meet even the most stringent regulatory requirements. It gives customers flexibility in the way they manage data for cost optimization, access control, and compliance. S3 provides query-in-place functionality, allowing you to run powerful analytics directly on your data at rest in S3. And Amazon S3 is the most supported cloud storage service available, with integration from the largest community of third-party solutions, systems integrator partners, and other AWS services.

Amazon S3 Glacier: Amazon S3 Glacier is a secure, durable, and extremely low-cost cloud storage service for data archiving and long-term backup. It is designed to deliver 99.999999999% durability, and provides comprehensive security and compliance capabilities that can help meet even the most stringent regulatory requirements. Amazon S3 Glacier provides query-in-place functionality, allowing you to run powerful

analytics directly on your archive data at rest. To keep costs low yet suitable for varying retrieval needs, Amazon S3 Glacier provides three options for access to archives, from a few minutes to several hours.

Custom

Although the services and features mentioned here are not an exhaustive list, Amazon Web Services is continuously adding new capabilities. We encourage you to visit the [AWS What's New](#) web page, as well as the [AWS Security web page](#) for additional information. In addition to the security services that AWS offers as native cloud services, you may be interested in building your own capabilities on top of AWS services.

Although we recommend enabling a base set of security services within your accounts, such as AWS CloudTrail, Amazon GuardDuty, and Amazon Macie, you may eventually want to extend these capabilities to derive additional value from your log assets. There are a number of partner tools available, such as those listed in our APN Security Competency program. Furthermore, you may want to write your own queries to search your logs. With the extensive number of managed services that AWS offers, this has never been easier. There are many additional AWS services that can assist you with investigation that are outside the scope of this whitepaper, such as Amazon Athena, Amazon Elasticsearch Service, Amazon QuickSight, Amazon Machine Learning, Amazon EMR, and so on.